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Doing Business on an Indian Reservation: 
Can the Non-Indian Enforce His Contract 
with the Tribe? 
Richard M. Grimsrud* 
With the advent of modern technology, which makes the In- 
dian reservation far less remote, and with the growing shortage 
of domestic energy sources, which makes the reservation's natu- 
ral resources far more attractive, the growth of non-Indian com- 
mercial involvement on the reservation is all but inevitable. This 
is so notwithstanding new federal legislation designed to further 
the tribe's own, internal economic development.' One factor in- 
hibiting this outside investment, however, is the residuum of tri- 
bal sovereignty in the form of the tribal-immunity doctrine.' 
This doctrine has been interpreted to forbid any suit against the 
tribe-the logical party with which the outside investor would 
contract-in either federal or state courts. The logic of the tri- 
bal-immunity doctrine also forecloses a suit against the tribe in 
tribal court. Accordingly, the non-Indian businessman is under- 
standably wary of the possibility that, should the tribe breach 
the contract, he would have no forum in which to enforce the 
agreement. 
It has uniformly been determined that the doctrine of tribal 
immunity bars suits against Indian tribes in state courtss and 
* B.A.; 1965, Ripon College; J.D., 1971, Harvard University. 
1. See, e.g., Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. 33 1451-1543 (1976). 
2. The tribal-immunity doctrine derives from the limited sovereignty of the Indian 
tribes recognized by Chief Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 
Pet.) 1 (1831). See Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977) for a detailed discu- 
sion of the doctrine. While its continuing vitality has been recently doubted, it is still a 
formidable barrier to suit against a tribe. See D. GETCHES, D. ROSENPELT & C. W ~ K I N -  
SON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 259-60 (1979). 
3. See, e.g., Morgan v. Colorado River Indian Tribe, 103 Ariz. 425, 427-28,443 P.2d 
421, 423-24 (1968); Bennett v. Fink Constr. Co., 47 Misc. 2d 283, 285, 262 N.Y.S.2d 331, 
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similarly prohibits actions against subordinate tribal economic 
organizations: unless the tribe or Congress has consented to suit 
and waived the immunity.' The doctrine has also been held to 
bar suits against tribal officials for actions taken within the 
scope of their official duties? Although the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Dep't of Game7 held that 
"tribal immunity" does not protect a tribal officer from suit, 
some courts have continued to hold, in spite of Puyallup, that 
tribal immunity forbids suits against tribal officers as well as 
tribes? 
In Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway,@ the Ninth Circuit held that 
the tribal-immunity doctrine proscribes a suit against an Indian 
tribe in federal court unless Congress has unequivocally waived 
the immunity or the tribe has consented to the suit. In that case, 
the Hopi traditionalist faction was suing to nullify the Black 
Mesa lease into which the tribe had entered. The plaintiffs had 
not even named the Hopi tribe as a defendant, but the court 
333 (SUP. Ci. 1965). 
4. White Mountain Apache Indian Tribe v. Shelley, 107 Ariz. 4, 6-7, 480 P.2d 654, 
656-57 (1971). 
5. Morgan v. Colorado River Indian Tribe, 103 Ariz. 425, 428, 443 P.2d 421, 424 
(1968). There is a serious question whether a tribe alone, without congressional approval, 
could waive its tribal immunity and consent to suit. United States v. United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940), has been interpreted to require con- 
gressional approval of a tribal waiver of its immunity, and this congressional action will 
not be implied if not unequivocally expressed. Long v. Chemehvevi Indian Reservation, 
171 Cal. Rptr. 733, 735 (1981). 
The most recent court of appeals decision to consider the question, however, held 
that an ordinance consenting to suit against the tribe in state court, which was passed by 
a tribal council and approved by a delegate of the Secretary of Interior, was an effective 
waiver of tribal immunity. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537,540 (10th Cir. 
1980). The finality of this determination will be uncertain for some time, since the Su- 
preme Court granted certiorari on October 6th of 1980. 101 S. Ct. 71. It should be noted 
further that such a tribal ordinance need be approved by the Secretary only if the tribal 
constitution explicitly reserves to him such power of approval or disapproval, see, eg., 
State v. District Court, 609 P.2d 290, 291 (Mont. 1980), but it is certainly far from clear 
that the tribe alone could waive its immunity under these circumstances. 
6. White Mountain Apache Indian Tribe v. Shelley, 107 Ariz. 4, 7-8, 480 P.2d 654, 
657-58 (1971). 
7. 433 U.S. 165,168 n.3,171-72 (1977). See also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 
US. 49, 59 (1978). Of course, this amenability to suit will most likely exist only in tribal 
court and only for activities of tribal officers which are ultra vires of their official duties. 
Cf. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (finding absolute privilege for government official 
in libel action); and F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 284 (1958). 
8. See, e.g., Graves v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 117 Arii. 32,570 P.2d 803 (Ct. 
App. 1977). 
9. 520 F.2d 1324, 1326 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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held that the tribe, as the lessor, was an indispensable party.1° 
The court reasoned that because of the doctrine of tribal immu- 
nity, "the plaintiff thus does not have any forum to which it can 
resort."ll 
The various tribes' nonamenability to suit has become in- 
creasingly problematical as they attempt to attract the invest- 
ment of capital from outside the reservation. Monroe Price poses 
the following question: If an entrepreneur seeks to do business 
on an Indian reservation, what guarantee does he have that the 
tribal organization will keep to its promises?"12 "None" appears 
to be the answer, although Price proposes a more sensible solu- 
tion than the absolute bar of tribal immunity: 
Judicial power should be withheld from cases involving Indian 
tribes or individual Indians only because intervention would 
violate a federal statute or some clearly defined congressional 
policy. 
The courts should replace the doctrine of residual sov- 
ereignity with a new doctrine based on Congress' present poli- 
cies, beginning with the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934. . . . Those policies require that the courts and the pro- 
tections of the Federal Constitution be available to non-Indi- 
ans who enter into commercial relations with Indian tribes? 
While Price's approach may appeal to reason, it is not the law. 
Just recently the U.S. Supreme Court forcefully reiterated the 
doctrine of tribal immunity1' to bar a suit against a tribe in fed- 
eral court for alleged violations of the Indian Civil Rights Act.l5 
More recent federal court interpretations of the immunity doc- 
trine have applied it even more extensively to frustrate the exer- 
cise of federal court jurisdiction over tribes." 
10. Id. at  1325-27. 
11. Id. 
12. M. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN I DIAN 635 (1973). 
13. Id. at 636 (quoting from Schaab, Indian Industrial Development and the 
Courts, 8 NAT. RESOURCES J. 303, 309 (1968)). 
14. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 US. at  58 (holding that only a cause in 
habeas corpus lies under the Act in federal court). 
15. 25 U.S.C. $3 1301-1341 (1976). 
16. See e.g., Gold v. Confederated Tribes, 478 F. Supp. 190, 196 (D. Or. 1979), hold- 
ing that a tribe's participation in the formulation of a distribution plan for an Indian 
Claims Commission award did not waive its immunity to subject it to suit by members 
challenging the plan; United States v. Karlen, 476-F. Supp. 306,310 (D.S.D. 1979), where 
the district court declined to take jurisdiction over a counterclaim filed by a rancher for 
trespasses of a tribe's cattle on his land against the United States which had sued the 
rancher on behalf of the tribe for trespass by his cattle and breaches of his lease with the 
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A departure from this trend of limiting federal court juris- 
diction over tribes occurred in Sturdevant v. Wilber,17 in which 
tribal members were contesting a proposed governmental action 
by their own tribe. There the federal court decided to exercise 
jurisdiction primarily because the tribe did not have a tribal 
court to hear the ~ontroversy.~~ The absence of a tribal court 
apparently would not have changed the result in the Ninth Cir- 
cuit case of Lomayaktewa,lB and, since most tribes today have 
their own tribal courts, the precise Sturdevant factual situation 
is not ordinarily presented. 
But the Sturdevant decision is a reasonable and flexible ap- 
plication of the tribal-immunity doctrine, and the rationale be- 
hind the decision might be extended to provide the basis for ob- 
taining jurisdiction over an Indian tribe even where a tribal 
court exists. The argument can be developed as follows: Just as 
the district court in Sturdevant exercised jurisdiction based on 
the nonavailability of a remedy (because there was no forum), so 
should any other federal district court hear the complaint of a 
commercial enterprise which has no remedy against the tribe in 
either state or tribal court. This nonavailability of a remedy will 
nearly always be the case. In addition to barring suit against the 
tribe in state court, the tribal-immunity doctrine will likely pre- 
vent suit against the tribe in tribal court as well for two reasons: 
(1) There is rarely an explicit and unequivocal waiver of tribe's 
immunity in either its charter,'O constitution and bylaws, or or- 
tribe. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1979) (Indian viola- 
tor of tribal game ordinance could not be tried in federal court under a broader yet still 
applicable statute even though there was no tribal court in existence at the time of the 
offense). But see United States ex rel. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. Tri-County Bank, 415 
F. Supp. 858 (D.S.D. 1976). 
17. 456 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Wis. 1978). 
18. Id. at  431. This is the only convincing distinction between Sturdevant and 
Martinez made by the court. 
19. 520 F.2d at 1326-27. 
20. 25 U.S.C. 5 477 (1976), authorizes the issuance of a federal charter of incorpora- 
tion to petitioning tribes. Such charters usually include a clause under which the tribal 
corporation consents to suit in any court of competent jurisdiction in the United States. 
See e.g., Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 150 Colo. 504, 508, 374 P.2d 691, 693 (1962). 
While section 477 envisages that the tribes will conduct their commercial business with 
outsiders through these federal corporations, Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian 
Community, 451 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (D. Alaska 1978), the tribes with charters almost 
uniformly contract as tribes rather than in the names of these federal corporations. Tele- 
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dinances; and (2) by analogy to the principle that a federal court 
clearly cannot exercise jurisdiction over the United States with- 
out the latter's explicit waiver of its sovereign immunity:' the 
tribal-immunity doctrine logically would also require a tribal 
court to decline jurisdiction over a claim against the tribe with- 
out such an explicit waiver. Consequently, under present law, 
there is no forum in which a tribe contracting in its own name 
can be made to live up to its c o n t r a ~ t s . ~ ~  
It must be recalled, however, that whatever the utilitarian 
common sense of this contention, stare decisis offers little sup- 
port for its logic," although some commentators have inter- 
preted Santa Clara Pueblo u. Martinez, as permitting the fed- 
eral court to assume jurisdiction in these circumstances." 
Nevertheless, the latest circuit court opinion to consider this is- 
sue has clearly reafiirmed the tribal-immunity doctrine in a com- 
mercial setting," as did the Tenth Circuit recently in a civil- 
rights context patently differing from Sturdevant only in that 
phone interview with Robert Moeller, Attorney Adviser, Field Solicitor's Office, Dep't of 
the Interior, in Phoenix, Ariz. (Feb. 6, 1980). 
Despite the Martinez v. Southern Ute holding, it is clear that a waiver of immunity 
in a federal charter extends only to the tribal corporation and not to the tribe. See, e.g., 
Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Community, 451 F. Supp. at  1131; Duluth Lum- 
ber & Plywood Co. v. Delta Dev., Inc., 281 N.W.2d 377, 384 (Minn. 1979). Even if the 
waiver could be construed to extend to the tribe, however, it is doubtful that the issu- 
ance of the form charter by the Department of the Interior would amount to the consent 
of Congress arguably required for such waiver by United States v. United States Fidelity 
& Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940). 
21. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586-87 (1941). 
22. The landmark decision of Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959), which pro- 
moted the non-Indian's use of the tribal courts to collect Indian debts, concerned a con- 
tract action against an individual Indian and, thus, did not involve the doctrine of tribal 
immunity. 
Just before the Sturdeuant decision, the Supreme Court had vigorously reaf- 
firmed the tribal-immunity doctrine in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 
(1978), and every circuit which had previously considered the issue had clearly adopted 
the doctrine much earlier. See, e.g., Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota 
Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1967); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Citizens Natl Bank, 
361 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1966); Green v. Wilson, 331 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1964); Dicke v. 
Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, Inc., 304 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1962); Haile v. Saunooke, 246 
F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1957). Cf. United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 316 U.S. 694 (1941) (denying tribal immunity from state laws). 
24. See, e.g., Comment, Tribal Sovereignty and the Supreme Court's 1977-1978 
Term, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 205,214-16; Note, Constitutional Law: Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez: Tribal Membership and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 6 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
205, 214-16 (1978); 14 LAND & WATER L. REV. 625, 633-34 (1979). 
25. Trans-Canada Enterprises, Ltd. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 634 F.2d 474, 476 
(9th Cir. 1980). 
324 BRXGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I981 
the plaintiff was a non-Indian.'6 
IV. RECOVERY INQUANTUM ERUIT 
Another approach for the complaining non-Indian promisee, 
with no greater basis in logic but a somewhat firmer foundation 
in precedent, is a suit against the tribe in quantum meruit 
(rather than upon the express contract). The basis for this the- 
ory is the Supreme Court case of Winton v. Amos," which in- 
volved the claim of an attorney for services rendered in securing 
the tribal enrollment and the consequent participation in federal 
monies for Choctaws who had removed to Oklahoma. Some of 
the lawyer's contracts with the Indians were held to be void be- 
cause they were made in violation of a predecessor statute to 25 
U.S.C. 08 81-85 (1976).s8 Nevertheless, the Court permitted a re- 
covery in quantum meruit: 
The fact that . . . the services were rendered under con- 
tracts with particular Indians, whether valid or invalid, is no 
obstacle to a recovery. Services not gratuitous, and neither 
mala in se nor mala prohibita, rendered under a contract that 
is invalid or unenforceable, may furnish a basis for an implied 
or constructive contract to pay their reasonable value.as 
While Winton v. Amos is distinguishable from the situation in 
which a non-Indian is seeking recovery for the value of services 
which he has performed under a contract with a tribe:O its un- 
just enrichment rationale may well be the best theory upon 
which a commercial enterprise that has already entered into a 
contract with a tribe can rely? 
For the businessman contemplating a contract with a tribe, 
surely the best protection he can secure for himself is to insist 
that the federally chartered tribal corporation (organized under 
26. Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe, 623 F.2d 670, 673 (10th Cir. 1980). 
27. 255 U.S. 373 (1921). 
28. Id. at 391. These statutes generally inhibit Indians' capacity to contract only 
with regard to trust property. See F. COHEN, supra note 8, at 164. 
29. 225 U.S. at 393. See also Green v. Menominee Tribe, 233 U.S. 558 (1914). 
30. Winton u. Amos again concerned a suit against individual Indians. 
31. For another quantum meruit recovery against Indians, see Rollins v. United 
States, 23 Ct. C1. 106 (1888). 
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25 U.S.C. 5 477) rather than the tribe (organized under 25 
U.S.C. 5 476) be the legal entity with which he contracts. This is 
because most tribal corporations have, in their charters, ex- 
plicitly waived whatever immunity they might otherwise have 
possessed, though, even if they had not, it is doubtful today 
whether they could avail themselves of the tribal-immunity doc- 
trine." Although most of the corporations chartered under the 
Indian Reorganization Act were intended to be the vehicles 
through which the reorganized tribes would contract with non- 
Indians, they have seldom been used? 
The non-Indian is not always alone in his desire to contract 
with the corporation. A tribe may itself wish to contract through 
its corporation. It may understandably be apprehensive about 
its chances for obtaining jurisdiction over a contractual dispute 
with a non-Indian in tribal courtS4 and about its likelihood for 
success on the merits in state c0urt,8~ because there is some au- 
thority for the proposition that an Indian tribe cannot sue in 
federal court for a simple breach of contract any more than the 
non-Indian party to the contract can.86 Hence, the tribe, as well 
as the non-Indian party to the contract, could well find itself 
without a forum which will afford an effective remedy in the 
event of a breach?' 
Moreover, nonamenability to suit in any forum is probably 
not something the tribes consciously wish to take advantage of; 
32. See In re Colegrove, 9 B.R. 337 (Cal. Bankr. 1981). 
33. See note 21 supra. I t  should be noted here that the Navajo tribe, easily the 
largest in the nation, did not opt to reorganize under the Act. This discussion is there- 
fore generally inapplicable to it. 
34. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978); Oliphant v. Su- 
quamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,209-12 (1978); F. COHEN, supra note 8, a t  382 n.210. 
35. See generally F. COHEN, supra note 8, at 164; In re Liquor Election in Beltrami 
County, 138 Minn. 42, 163 N.W. 988 (1917). For potential jurisdictional problems, see 
also Northcross v. Joslyn Fruit Co., 439 F. Supp. 317 (D. Ariz. 1977); Maloof v. Raper 
Sales, Inc., 113 Ariz. 485, 557 P.2d 522 (1976). 
36. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Martinez, 519 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1975). The 
Ninth Circuit also recently acceded to this view. Gila River Indian Community v. Hen- 
ningson, Durham & Richardson, 626 F.2d 708, 714 (9th Cir. 1980). 
37. On the surface, however, courts have often been more generous in providing a 
forum to a tribe than to its litigational counterpart, notwithstanding the logical inconsis- 
tencies which may result. Compare, e.g., Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State 
Bd. of Equalization, 492 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Cal. 1979), which held that tribal immunity 
barred the assertion of a compulsory counterclaim by a state agency against a tribe 
which had commenced a declaratory judgment action against the agency in federal court, 
with People v. Quechan Tribe, 595 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1979), which determined 
that the doctrine of tribal immunity foreclosed a state's maintenance of a declaratory 
judgment action against a tribe in federal court. 
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there is little doubt that tribal immunity has a chilling effect on 
any outside investment the tribes might wish to attract." Conse- 
quently, the whole problem of tribal immunity can be circum- 
vented if the potential investor is aware of the little-recognized 
difference between the tribe and the federally chartered tribal 
commercial corporation and insists upon doing business only 
with the latter.39 
VI. JURISDICTION OVER THE UNITED STATES AS GUARDIAN OF 
THE TRIBE 
Of course, the distinction between the tribe and the tribal 
corporation will be of little consolation to the investor who has 
already contracted with the tribe and partially performed under 
the contract. However, there is arguably yet one more remedy 
for the non-Indian party to the contract with the tribe. This is 
available when, as is often the case with monies designated for 
tribal contracts with non-Indians,'O the funds to be paid over by 
the tribe are in the form of loans or grants from the federal gov- 
ernment, or are being held in trust and administered by the 
United States, and the contract has been approved by the fed- 
eral government. Under these circumstances, the non-Indian can 
proceed against the United States, which has waived its sover- 
eign immunity in a fairly extensive array of causes, on the basis 
of its guardianship over the tribe and its estate. 
This approach has the obvious advantage of providing the 
federal court with another basis upon which to ground its juris- 
diction. The United States has waived its immunity, in limited 
cases, from suits brought against it not only before the Court of 
Claims4l but also before the appropriate federal district courte4= 
The jurisdictional grant to the Court of Claims is for contract 
claims of any amount; the waiver for suits in the district courts 
is for both contract claims of less than $10,W3 and torts.44 The 
tort claims, before suit may be filed upon them," must first be 
38. See Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Community, 451 F. Supp. at 1131. 
39. See id. at 1133 n.8. 
40. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 3 3161(a)(3) (1976), which specifically singles out Indian res- 
ervations as areas of likely eligibility for grants and loans under the Public Works and 
Economic Development Act, 42 U.S.C. 53  3121-3246h (1976). 
41. 28 U.S.C. 5 1491 (1976). 
42. Id. 3 1346. 
43. Id. 5 1346(a)(2). 
44. Id. 1346(b). 
45. Id. 5 2675(a). 
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submitted to the appropriate governmental body with a written 
demand for a sum ~ertain. '~ 
For smaller claims then, the best section under which to 
proceed is probably 28 U.S.C. 8 1346(a)(2)," which authorizes 
the federal district courts to assume jurisdiction over any 
civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding 
$10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or 
any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive depart- 
ment, or upon any express or implied contract with the United 
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not 
sounding in tort.18 
This subsection presents several possible theories under which 
the Indian ward's estate might be reached by the non-Indian 
promisee obtaining jurisdiction over the guardian government. 
First, if the federal funds have not been turned over to the 
tribe but remain in the hands of the disbursing government of- 
ficer, mandamus against the officer compelling him to distribute 
the funds to the performing promisee might be sought under 
whatever "regulation of an executive department" controls the 
disbursement.'@ However, the writ will lie only when the govern- 
46. Molinar v. United States, 515 F.2d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Caton v. 
United States, 495 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1974) for the general validity of 28 C.F.R. $5 14.1 
to 14.11 (1980), the interpretative regulations promulgated by the Attorney General pur- 
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1976) which govern the administrative claims procedure. 
47. Subsection (b) of 28 U.S.C. 1346 (1976) waives federal immunity in damage 
actions 
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negli- 
gent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while 
acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where 
the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in 
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 
Since the United States would not breach any clear duty by approving a tribe's contract 
with a non-Indian, it is hard to see how its tort liability could arise. See, e.g., Salt River 
Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. Arizona Sand & Rock Co., 353 F. Supp. 1098 (D. 
Ariz. 1972). 
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)(1976). 
49. For example, the disbursement of the funds for certain Economic Development 
Administration grants is regulated by 13 C.F.R. 305.86 (1980). If all of the prerequisites 
of that section are met by the performing non-Indian promisee and still the funds are 
not disbursed to him upon his application for them, it  is certainly arguable that a man- 
damus under 28 U.S.C. §$ 1346(a)(2), 1361 (1976) would lie in the United States district 
court against the government officer holding the funds. For a case where a Congressional 
appropriation was held to lay the basis for jurisdiction under the "Act of Congress" 
clause of 28 U.S.C. 8 1346(a)(2) (1976), see Benedict v. United States, 270 F. 267 (Ct. C1. 
1928). See also Overlook Nursing Home, Inc. v. United States, 556 F.2d 500,502 (Ct. C1. 
1977). 
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mental agent against whom it is sought owes a duty to the party 
seeking the writ.60 Thus, some doubt exists whether a manda- 
mus would be appropriate in this context since the government's 
duty to disburse probably runs only to the tribe." 
A second theory would be that, in the situation under dis- 
cussion, there is an "implied contract" between the non-Indian 
promisee and the government that the promisee will be paid for 
any performance he actually renders under the contract ap- 
proved by the government. The trouble with this theory is two- 
fold. The first problem occurred in the case of In re Sanborn," 
where an attorney had attached federal funds appropriated for 
the Sisseton and Wahpeton Tribes in an effort to secure pay- 
ment for legal services already rendered under a contract ap- 
proved by the government. There the Supreme Court said that 
statutes requiring government approval of such contracts "by no 
means create a legal obligation on the part of the United States 
to see that the Indians perform their part of such c~ntracts ."~ 
Second, and more significantly, this "implied contract" theory 
has been authoritatively interpreted to encompass only contracts 
implied in fact and not those implied in law;" and there is no 
doubt that a recovery in quantum meruit is grounded in the the- 
ory of quasi-contract or a contract implied in law.66 
Consequently, the optimum clause in 28 U.S.C. 8 1346(a)(2) 
upon which to base an action against the government for a 
quantum meruit recovery in federal courtW is likely the clause 
50. See, e.g., Short v. Murphy, 512 F.2d 374, 377 (6th Cir. 1975). 
51. By analogy, Gardiner Mfg. Co. v. United States, 479 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1973), 
held that a subcontractor derives no contract rights exercisable against the United States 
under a contract between his prime contractor and the government. 
But see Porter v. United States, 496 F.2d 583,586-87 (Ct. C1. 1974), holding that an 
instrumentality of the United States acting within its authority binds the United States 
as a principal to its contracts, and U.S. v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903), holding that 
Indian tribes are such federal instrumentalities. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 598, 603 (1943). 
52. 148 U.S. 222 (1893). 
53. Id. a t  227. 
54. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 287, 293 (1928). How- 
ever, for expansive interpretations of the "implied contract" clause, see Bodek v. Depart- 
ment of the Treasury, 532 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1976); Armstrong & Armstrong, Inc. v. 
United States, 514 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1975). 
55. See, e.g., Baltimore Mail S.S. Co. v. United States, 76 F.2d 582, 584 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 296 U.S. 595 (1933); 12 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS $5 1459- 
1459A (3d ed. 1970). 
56. For claims over $10,000, an action could be brought in the Court of Claims. 28 
U.S.C. $ 1491 (1976). 
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which authorizes actions for "liquidated or unliquidated dam- 
ages in cases not sounding in tort." Under this clause, the prom- 
isee would proceed against the United States as guardian of its 
Indian ward's estate and seek recovery from that estate for the 
value of his performance under the contract with the Indian 
ward. By proceeding against the United States, the non-Indian 
would avoid the tribal-immunity problem, thus permitting the 
federal court to assume jurisdiction. The recovery would ulti- 
mately be from the tribe," the other party to the partially per- 
formed contract. 
This cause of action is well established in law. It has long 
been recognized that the United States is the "guardian"58 of 
the Indian tribes and the "trustee"6e of their property rights and 
that the Indian tribes are "wards"6o of the federal government. 
Similarly, it is the undisputed general rule that 
Although a [guardian] . . . is intrusted with the care and ad- 
ministration of his [ward's] estate, he cannot nullify an agree- 
ment made by such [ward] with an innocent third person, ap- 
parently with the consent of the [guardian], in regard to the 
disposition of such estate. 
A contract made by [a ward], under the power of a guard- 
ian and by his consent, is binding on the guardian but not 
otherwise."' 
The guardian will be made to live up to his ward's contract "es- 
pecially where the contract is not merely executory, but exe- 
cuted in the whole or in part . . . and the parties cannot be re- 
stored altogether to their original position~."~~ Moreover, since it 
57. Recovery would actually come from the funds of the tribe which are, in effect, 
being held for it by its guardian, the federal government. Cf. Manchester Band of Pomo 
Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (government has a 
duty to properly manage a tribe's funds held for it in trust by the government); Hoopa 
Valley Tribe v. United States, 596 F.2d 435 (Ct. C1. 1979). 
58. The essential guardianship of the United States over the Indian tribes was first 
set forth by John Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at  17. 
59. See, e.g., United States v. 7,405.3 Acres of Land, 97 F.2d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 
1938); Rainbow v. Young, 161 F. 835, 836-37 (8th Cir. 1908). 
60. See, e.g., United States v. 7,405.3 Acres of Land, 97 F.2d a t  422; Oklahoma Tax 
Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. at  607. 
61. 39 C.J.S. Guardian a d  Ward Q 76(c), a t  150 (1976) (footnotes omitted). See 
also Stakes v. Jones, 125 So. 197 (La. Ct. App. 1919); Heffner v. Crowley Motor Co., 12 
La. App. 451, 125 So. 198 (1929); May v. Webb, Kirby, 286 Conn. 11 (1787); Camp v. 
Dill, 27 Ma. 553 (1855). 
62. 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 55, Q 254, at  87 (quoting Molton v. Camroux, 2 Ex. 
487, 154 Eng. Rep. 548 (1848), aff'd, 4 Ex. 17, 154 Eng. Rep. 1107 (1849)). See also 2 S. 
WILLISTON, supra note 55, Q 251, a t  80. 
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is entirely possible that a guardian might be personally liable in 
these circumstancespa a fortiori, the ward's estate could be held 
responsible for the goods or services for which the ward con- 
tracted (and received) with the guardian's consent? 
VII. ~URISDICTION OVER THE UNITED STATES AS TRUSTEE OF 
THE TRIBE'S ESTATE 
The trustee-beneficiary relationship of the United States 
and the tribe offers an even more promising theory upon which a 
district court may assume jurisdiction. The invasion of a trust 
established for the care and support of its beneficiarybs has been 
upheld where the goods or services provided, for which payment 
is sought, were not voluntarily contracted for by either the trust- 
ees or the beneficiary? Thus, the funds of the tribe held in trust 
for it by its "trustee" should be reachable here, where the goods 
or services rendered were specifically contracted for and received 
by the beneficiary tribe with the explicit approval of its trustee, 
the U.S. Government. 
It is the general rule that, when a third person contracts 
with a trust beneficiary and, by providing goods or services to 
the beneficiary under the contract, assists "in the accomplish- 
ment of the purposes of the trust . . . , [the third person] may 
be permitted to recover from the trust estate the value of the 
goods furnished or services rendered by a suit in equity against 
the trustee as such."67 Typically the only contracts which fall 
within this rule concern the rendition of "ne~essaries."~~ How- 
ever, its logic should encompass any goods or services provided 
which benefit the trust estate0@ or "preserve or benefit the inter- 
est of the beneficiary,'"O- which, in a word, promote the "pur- 
63. See, e.g., Camp v. Dill, 27 Ala. 553 (1855). 
64. While a recovery from the estate of a ward cannot be had for the unauthorized 
contracts of his guardian, see, e.g., McKee v. Hunt, 142 Cal. 526, 77 P. 1103 (1904), the 
ward's estate should be reachable for his own contracts to which the guardian merely 
assented. 
65. According to the Supreme Court in Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 
476, 497 (1937), the federal trust is to "manage the property and affairs of Indians in 
good faith for their betterment and welfare . . . ." 
66. See, e.g., In re Estate of Johnson, 198 Cal. App. 2d 503,17 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1961); 
Estate of Lackman v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 165 Cal. App. 2d 674, 320 P.2d 
186 (1958). See also State ex rel. Conway v. Glenn, 60 Ariz. 22, 131 P.2d 363 (1942). 
67. 3 A. S c m ,  THE LAW OF TRUSTS 5 269.3, at  2279 (3d ed. 1967). 
68. 2 id. 5 157.2, at  1216. 
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 5 269 (1959). 
70. Id. 5 157(c). 
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poses of the trust.'"' Those purposes are, in the governmental 
trust under consideration, to "manage the property and affairs 
of Indians in good faith for their betterment or welfare? 
Hence, a persuasive argument that can be made is that the 
value of goods or services already provided under a contract 
with a tribe (which goods or services clearly better the tribe or 
promote its welfare) should be recoverable by the providing 
party from the tribe's estate via a suit in equity against the 
tribe's trustee, the United States of America. Inasmuch as this 
result follows even where the trustee has no notice of the trans- 
action," the same result should follow where the trustee has ap- 
proved the contract." 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of tribal immunity, which now undeniably 
forecloses a suit against a tribe in either federal7' or state court76 
and, if consistently applied, would do the same in tribal court,17 
is a barrier which probably inhibits the flow of much-needed pri- 
vate capital, goods, and services onto the reservation. Under- 
standably, the outsider does not wish to invest money or deliver 
goods or services in reliance upon a contract for which there will 
be no forum for its enforcement. 
For the non-Indian promisee who has already entered into 
and partially performed a contract with a tribe, there are several 
theories in which he might ground his action to recover in fed- 
eral court. He might sue in quantum meruit, which approach is 
not absolutely unsupported by precedent,18 rather than upon the 
express contract. Or, after he demonstrates the futility of a rem- 
edy in tribal court (which court should, under the doctrine of 
tribal immunity, dismiss the suit7@), he might bring an equity 
71. 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 67, § 269.3, at 2279. 
72. Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497 (1937). 
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 5 163 (1959); 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 67, $8 
269.3, 157.2. 
74. The major theoretical obstacle to this approach is that, since an action resulting 
in a judgment which would expend itself upon the U.S. Treasury is considered an action 
against the United States, Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963), an action which 
would result in a recovery against tribal funds held in trust by the United States might 
analogously be considered an action against the tribe. 
75. Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d at 1326. 
76. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Shelley, 107 Ariz. at  6-8, 408 P.2d at  656-58. 
77. See note 22 and accompanying text supra. 
78. Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. at 393. 
79. It is doubtful that the tribal court could take jurisdiction over the non-Indian if 
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action in federal court, appealing to the conscience of the court 
because he cannot get a hearing on the merits anywhere else? If 
the contract contemplated the disbursement of federal funds 
and has some form of federal sanction, the non-Indian's com- 
plaint against the tribe should be combined with one against the 
government (which has waived its sovereign immunity in 28 
U.S.C. 85 1346 and 1491) as the guardians1 or trusteesa of the 
tribe's estate. 
The best solution, however, is to simply avoid the tribal-im- 
munity problem. The non-Indian who has not yet entered into 
the contract with the tribe can accomplish this by simply insist- 
ing that the formal party with which he contracts be not the 
tribe, but rather the tribal ~orporation.~~ It was through this en- 
tity that the Indian Reorganization Act envisioned the tribe 
would do business, and it is this entity that, in its corporate 
charter, consented to suit in any court of otherwise competent 
jurisdiction. 
the tribe brought the suit. However, if the non-Indian commenced the action in tribal 
court, he would of course, be submitting to its jurisdiction. If, then, the tribal court does 
not dismiss on tribal immunity but hears the case on the merits and decides in favor of 
the tribe on the basis of customary tribal law where an application of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence would clearly find tribal liability, an entirely different and possibly even 
more intriguing question involving tribal sovereignty is presented. 
80. See Sturdevant v. Wilber, 456 F. Supp. at 431. 
81. See notes 40 through 64 and accompanying text supra. 
82. See notes 65 through 74 and accompanying text supra. But see In re Sanbom, 
148 U.S. 222 (1893), where an attempt to reach tribal funds for a tribal debt in a suit 
against the United States was unsuccessful albeit on grounds not foreclosing the theory 
of recovery proposed here. 
83. See Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Community, 451 F. Supp. at 1131- 
33. See also Manekagon Dev. Co. v. Bois Forte Reservation Hous. Auth., 517 F.2d 508 
(8th Cir. 1975). 
